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第八，本文运用多项 Logistic 回归和混合 BP 神经网络构建上市公司信息披露
违规严重程度的预警模型，对检验样本的总体判别成功率分别为68.89%与71.39%，
可以较有效地对上市公司信息披露违规的严重程度进行预警。此外，本文尝试运

















与检验，并首次结合 Llorente et al.（2002）的研究成果，利用股票市场均衡时股票
收益率与换手率的动态关系系数 C2 来测度上市公司股票交易的信息不对称程度，























































Disclosure information, which is the essence of the public principle, is in fact the 
most effective means to regulate listed companies, protect minority shareholders and 
promote market efficiency to allocate resources. A listed company shall ensure that 
potential investors have access to all statutory disclosure information in a true, 
integrated, timely and adequate manner. Unfortunately, some listed companies in China 
have violated the securities laws and regulations via illegal disclosure activities, even 
refusing to mend their ways despite of repeated admonition. These illegal activities not 
only make minority shareholders suffer large economical losses, but also threaten the 
stabilization and healthy development of china stock market. Therefore, this paper 
selects the listed companies with illegal information disclosure as sample and start with 
a probe into the motivation of them. Then, it dwells upon the market responses 
following the punishment bulletins and tries to develop a general model to predict the 
illegal information disclosure behavior based on the perspectives of finance, market and 
governance. By this, this paper hopes to be helpful to investors and supervisors.  
This paper consists of nine chapters. Major contents of each chapter are outlined as 
follows: 
Chapter 1 is an introduction. It includes such contents as research background, 
issues under research, research framework, major research contents, improvement and 
innovations of this paper.  
Chapter 2 covers the literature reviews focusing on the ideas and findings of 
relevant researches on the motivation, market responses and prediction of illegal 
information disclosure of listed companies. 
Chapter 3 describes the institutional background of illegal information disclosure 
of listed companies in China.  
Chapter 4 analyzes the characteristics on the industries, scales, financial status, 
stock transaction, and corporate governance of the listed companies in China with 
illegal information disclosure. 
Chapter 5 provides the theoretical hypotheses and empirical tests of the 
motivations of illegal information disclosure of listed companies in China, including the 














Chapter 6 compares the different stock market responses of different illegal 
information disclosure events.  
Chapter 7 develops some prediction models to predict the illegal information 
disclosure behavior from the perspectives of finance, market and governance. 
Chapter 8 discusses the prevention mechanism of the illegal information disclosure 
of listed companies in China.  
Chapter 9 sums up the research findings of this paper, including its research 
conclusions and lessons, research limitations and the direction of further research. 
Based on the contributions of the related theoretical and empirical researches, 
considering the institutional background of stock market in China, this paper studies the 
motivations and market responses of the illegal information disclosure of listed 
companies in China thoroughly and develops some models to predict the illegal 
behavior. Thus, we get the following conclusions: 
Firstly, most of the fraud companies come from the well-developed industries, such 
as machines, equipments and instruments manufacturing, oil, chemical, rubber and 
plastic manufacturing and so on. Most of them are medium and small companies. And, 
most of the listing ages are within 6 years. Moreover, fraud companies have active stock 
transaction performance with high fluctuation. Generally, fraud companies have poor 
profit ability and operating efficiency. Thus, it is hard for them to pay debt due to poor 
asset quality while they fail to grow and create operating cash flow. Nearly half of fraud 
companies receive modified audit opinions from exterior auditors owing to their poor 
ownership restriction ability and poor internal control mechanism.  
Secondly, relative to control companies, fraud companies have more controlling 
shareholders’ tunneling activity, more inside trading and more earning management. 
Thirdly, investors think the illegal information disclosure activities encroaching 
their legitimate interests and react intensively to the administrative punishment by the 
China Security Regulatory Commission and the condemnation by the stock exchange. 
All the punishment bulletins are effective to some extent no matter they are made by 
China Security Regulatory Commission, Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. Investors depreciates greatly the stock value of fraud companies whose main 
violations includes delays in disclosure, inflated profits, illegal related-party transaction, 
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